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Abstract 
Hegel's Science of Logic makes the just not low claim to be an absolute, ultimate-
grounded knowledge. This project, which could not be more ambitious, has no good press in 
our post-metaphysical age. However: That absolute knowledge absolutely cannot exist, cannot 
be claimed without self-contradiction. On the other hand, there can be no doubt about the fun-
damental finiteness of knowledge. But can absolute knowledge be finite knowledge? This leads 
to the problem of a self-explication of logic (in the sense of Hegel) and further, as will be 
shown, to a new definition of the dialectical procedure. The stringency of which results from 
the fact that always exactly that implicit content is explicated that was generated by the prece-
ding explication step itself and is thus concretely comprehensible. At the same time, a new imp-
licit content is generated by this act of explication, which requires a new explication step, and 
so forth. In the dialectical procedure reinterpreted in this way, dialectical arguments are not be-
held, guessed at or even surreptitiously obtained, but are methodically accountable. Thereby 
dialectics is understood as a self-explication of logic by logical means and thus as a proof of the 
possibility of ultimate-grounding in the form of absolute and nevertheless finite – and thus also 
fallible – knowledge. 
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3. The system perspective 
4. The stringency of dialectical explication 
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1. Can finite knowledge be absolute knowledge? 
 
Hegel's Science of Logic – the paradigm of modern metaphysics par excellence – makes 
the just not low claim to be knowledge of the Absolute, absolute knowledge. This project, 
which could not be thought of in a more ambitious way, has no good press nowadays. Our 'post-
metaphysical' age is averse to metaphysical ventures that aim at super-empirical, unassailable 
knowledge (thus, following the traditional usage of language, metaphysical is understood in the 
following). So, in view of the clearly evident finiteness of knowledge, it is more obvious to con-
sider it not as final and absolute, but as provisional and outdatable. In fact, it depends on a num-
ber of preconditions: on traditions of thought, on the state of scientific knowledge, on cultural 
and ideological perspectives, etc. Admittedly, this does not seem to apply to mathematical 
knowledge. It is true that this science is also advancing inexorably, but the fact that one plus 
one is two should undeniably be true. On closer inspection, however, this is based on precondi-
tions, too, – the Peano axioms – which, as axioms, are not provable but hypotheses. In this 
sense even mathematical theorems are not of absolute but hypothetical charakter.2 The view that 
                                                 
1 Extended version of my contribution to the 2002 Congress of the International Hegel Society in Jena, 
Germany (28.08. – 01.09.2002). – Published: Dieter Wandschneider (2005) Letztbegründung unter der Bedingung 
endlichen Wissens. Eine Hegelsche Perspektive, in: Kellerwessel, Wulf/ Cramm, Wolf-Jürgen/ Krause, David/ 
Kupfer, Hans-Christoph (ed. 2005) Diskurs und Reflexion. Wolfgang Kuhlmann zum 65. Geburtstag. Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann 2005, 353–372. 
2 Plato therefore characterized mathematics as a 'hypothesis science' (Politeia 533b-c). One could argue: As 
hypothetical statements, i.e. if the axioms on which these are based are included in the mathematical statement, 
theorems have an absolute character: Thus, in the context of Euclidean geometry, i.e. assuming the corresponding 
axioms including the parallel axiom, the angular sum in the triangle is necessary 180° (if this axiom is dropped, 
one has, for example, a spherical geometry with a triangular angular sum greater than 180°) – but: mathematical 
 2 
absolute knowledge cannot exist in principle is therefore obvious. The predominantly sceptical 
attitude of contemporary philosophy corresponds to this. 
Now, a view according to which absolute knowledge is impossible in principle, itself 
claims to be absolute knowledge, and thus gets entangled in a pragmatic contradiction, i.e. a 
contradiction between the content of the statement and the claim to validity inevitably connec-
ted with it. That absolute knowledge absolutely cannot exist cannot be claimed without self-
contradiction and is therefore a false statement. This is the type of a transcendental argument 
known from the current discussion on the ultimate-grounding,3 which is also essentially in-
fluenced by the works of Wolfgang Kuhlmann. In this context, it has been argued that not eve-
rything can be doubted and disputed per se; because doubting and disputing also presupposes 
meaningful concepts, the possibility of argumentation and thus logic. Insofar as these are pre-
conditions of the possibility of disputing, this itself has reached an unassailable limit here. In 
such an assertion of 'ultimate reasons', something Absolute is indeed sighted, something that is 
valid par excellence, whose validity is independent of changing, contingent conditions,4 and can 
be sweepingly characterized as the logical conditions of argumentation. To dispute these is 
pragmatically self-contradictory. The view that there can be no absolute, ultimate-grounded 
knowledge cannot therefore be consistently held. The ultimate-grounding argument rather im-
plies a claim to absoluteness: Absolute knowledge must be possible in principle, and this very 
statement itself is already to be understood as an example of such absolute knowledge. 
Nevertheless, in view of our manifest cognitive limits, the suspicion of intellectual hubris 
– repeatedly articulated against the possibility of ultimate-grounding – remains: Is it not pre-
sumptuous to assume that this knowledge, characterized as absolute, is of quasi divine finality? 
The question arises how the pretended possibility of absolute knowledge can be compatible 
with the manifest finiteness of knowledge. Would it be conceivable, for instance, that the know-
ledge that is characterized as absolute can nevertheless be limited, for instance in the sense of 
partial knowledge? 
Let us look at a concrete example, familiar from the current discussion on ultimate-
grounding, in which a transcendental argument is asserted, similarly to the previous one: The 
statement 'truth is impossible' assumes that it itself is true. It contains a pragmatic contradiction 
and is therefore false. Also the possibility of truth proves to be something that cannot be mea-
ningfully questioned and therefore has an absolute character. On the other hand, there is the 
problem of truth and a research literature devoted to it that fills shelves, so that the question ari-
ses how the possibility of truth can be shown to be absolute on the one hand and highly proble-
matic on the other. 
The answer to this arises from the argument for the absoluteness of the possibility of truth 
itself: For this it is enough to know that a statement is always connected with the claim to be 
true – whatever 'truth' may mean beyond that. This minimal knowledge is sufficient, as explai-
ned, to prove that the statement 'truth is impossible' is self-contradictory. A theory of truth is 
not needed for this. The argument is valid without the need to solve the problem of truth first. It 
can and needs be clarified further, even if the possibility of truth in the given sense is to be re-
                                                                                                                                                                  
statements of this kind still have an essential prerequisite, namely logic. 
3 For example, Apel 1973, Kuhlmann 1985, Hösle 1990, Wandschneider 1994. 
4 'Absolute knowledge' here is thus understood in the usual sense of logically unassailable, un-conditioned 
knowledge, in contrast to Hegel's linguistic usage at the end of the Phenomenology of the Spirit. 'Absolute know-
ledge', although according to its chapter title thematic, appears rather incidentally only in three places (Hegel 
3.582 f, 591) and describes there the conclusion of the series of the forms of the spirit: "This last form of the spi-
rit, the spirit, which gives its complete and true content the form of the self at the same time and thereby realizes 
its concept in the same way as it remains in its concept in this realization, is absolute knowledge; it is the spirit 
that knows itself in spirit form or comprehending knowledge (Hegel 3.582). The latter has understood that the ob-
ject of knowledge is not absolutely alien to the spirit, but is nevertheless 'spirit-affine' in its otherness, and the spi-
rit is thus "in its otherness in itself" (Hegel 3.583) and so only truly spirit: absolute knowledge as "the spirit that 
knows itself as spirit" (Hegel 3.591). 'Absolute' here, then, refers to the completion of the spirit as spirit, not to the 
logical unassailability of his knowledge, which is thematic in the present context. That there are connections here 
is of course not to be denied – what absolute knowledge logically aims at, according to Hegel, is "the absolute 
concept" (Hegel 3.591) and further its externalisation in nature and spirit (Hegel 3.590 f). 
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garded as an unassailable, absolute knowledge. In short: The example shows that absoluteness 
and finiteness of knowledge can very well go together. This lets it appear justified and meaning-
ful to strive for absolute knowledge also under the – for humans irrevocable – condition of fini-
te knowledge: a for Hegel's metaphysics characteristic perspective, as Karen Gloy notices.5  The 
addressed 'hubris suspicion' has been finished by this: With the pretension to possess absolute, 
ultimate-grounded knowledge the finiteness of the knowledge, properly understood, is not de-
nied; God similarity is not laid claim to. 
 
2. The problem of the recognition of fundamental-logic 
 
If the fundamental possibility of absolute, ultimate-grounded knowledge can be regarded 
as clarified so far, the further question arises as to what is meant by this in more detail. As the 
developed considerations have made clear, transcendental arguments are essential for ultimate-
grounded knowledge, i.e. arguments concerning the logical conditions of argumentation itself. 
Thus it has been shown that the assertion of the impossibility of truth itself claims to be true and 
is therefore self-contradictory. Generally speaking, the self-contradiction results from the fact 
that logical conditions of argumentation (here the possibility of truth) are disputed, but for this 
disputing itself must already be claimed and in this sense – namely as a condition of the possibi-
lity of argumentation – have transcendental character. 
In this sense it can be said: The argumentation is based on a transcendental logic, which 
as such is in principle unassailable regarding the logic of argumentation. And vice versa: Only 
structures that are themselves fundamental transcendental-logical conditions of possible argu-
mentation can be argumentation-logically unassailable. In the following I would like to call the 
whole of such fundamental transcendental-logical structures (as in earlier works, e.g. 1994, 
2013) in short as fundamental-logic. To the question of what absolute, ultimate-grounded know-
ledge is possible of, the answer in the sense of these considerations is: of that – and only of that 
– basis of possible argumentation called 'fundamental-logic'. 
Not to be misunderstood: This logic, characterized as 'fundamental', is not one of the ma-
ny 'logics', if the different systems of formal logic are understood by that. These are rather sy-
stem constructs, which as such always contain conventional elements. Fundamental-logic, on 
the other hand, has a transcendental character, i.e. it is to be understood as precondition of the 
possibility of argumentation at all and thus is ultimately also the basis of those diverse 'logics'. 
To return to the question under negotiation here: As has been shown, absolute, ultimate- 
grounded knowledge is possible only from the fundamenta-logic (and, what I would like to only 
sweepingly point out, from 'fundamental-logically grounded objects', howsoever these were to 
be determined6 – this topic is not dealt with here). Admittedly, concerning the fundamental-
logic, it must be stated that it is not remotely known and argumentatively available in its entire-
ty, at least at the moment. The case of an absolute and nevertheless incomplete knowledge at 
any rate is given here. The fundamental-logical knowledge that has been already proven to be 
absolute at first only has punctual character. In this situation, the existence of a comprehensive 
system of fundamental-logic is at first a hypothesis. At the same time, it is this anticipation of 
the whole that motivates philosophical recognition in general to continue on the path of recogni-
tion of the absolute, this initially in the general sense of logical conditions of argumentation. 
Yet this reveals a highly worrying problem: For the further exploration of the fundamen-
tal-logic it needs to be argued. But the 'means of argumentation' are elements of this fundamen-
tal-logic itself, which itself has still to be recognized. These means of argumentation needed for 
this knowledge are not available, but are first to be made available by argumentation. But is it 
                                                 
5 "It is Hegel's specific achievement to have provided with his theory a model which permits the absolute 
and the finite [...] to think in one" (Gloy 1981: 135). As the author here parallelizes the Absolute and the Finite 
with reason, as "the possession of the system reason", and understanding, as "the ability of systematic explanati-
on", she sees in Hegel's philosophy the possibility of "assuming the coincidence of system reason and explicit sy-
stem" (ibid.) – a thought, which is confirmed in the following (ch. 3 and 4). 
6 Here, for example, the possibility of an a priori natural ontology could be considered; cf. e.g. Hösle 1987, 
Wandschneider 1985. 
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possible to argue, without already having the necessary logic of argumentation? What is still to 
be recognized needs already to be presupposed for its recognition here – a typically occurring 
problem, which Hegel points out e.g. in the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel 
3.69), as soon as recognition starts to recognize transcendental conditions of its recognition it-
self (see also Plato, Theaitetos, 196 d-e). This re-referencing of recognition to itself is characte-
ristic of the ultimate-grounding project. Can philosophy cope with this problem? 
In the introduction to phenomenology, Hegel argues that although recognition cannot step 
out of itself for grounding itself from outside, as it were, it does not need to do so, because it 
has "its measure in itself" (Hegel 3.76). These statements are very general. To give a concrete 
example, let us again consider the verdict of truth just discussed, 'truth is impossible'. This sta-
tement, as has been shown, is self-contradictory in the sense that it must claim what it denies 
for this very denial; a contradiction that proves such a position untenable7 – according to the 
principle of the to be avoided contradiction. 
Now, the principle of contradiction itself has not been explicitly established here as a 
principle of argumentation, and thus is not explicitly available for argumentation. It has therefo-
re not been explicitly claimed, too, and yet the validity of the exclusion of contradiction is evi-
dent – why? 
The contradiction cannot be admitted for the reason because it would level the difference 
between position and negation and thus eliminate the possibility of delimitation and definite-
ness (see Aristotle, Metaphysics Γ3-6): If both statements: 'truth is possible' and 'truth is impos-
sible' were equally admitted, then the predicates 'possible' and 'impossible' would no longer be 
distinguished; likewise in all other cases: 'red'/'non-red', 'heavy'/'non-heavy' etc., i.e. there 
would be no negation. Yet without negation there would be no definiteness, because all deter-
mining, according to Spinoza, is a delimitation.8 Thus, there could not be terms with a certain 
meaning, i.e. the possibility of meaning would be eliminated at all. Rather there can only be 
certainty and meaning if there is a negation, and this can only exist if the contradiction is exclu-
ded, in other words: Those who use senseful, meaningful terms have thus implicitly always al-
ready excluded the contradiction, without being to be explicitly formulated that as a principle of 
argumentation. The principle of contradiction implicitly comes into effect in all argumentation; 
it is, so to speak, effective 'under the surface'. 
Question: Is it possible to generalize this fact established for the contradiction principle; is 
the fundamental-logic altogether effective under the surface? This question seems to be unans-
werable, inasmuch as it concerns fundamental-logic in its entire, still unknown extent. Ne-
vertheless: If it were not always already entirely effective in argumentation, it would not be 
possible to argue, because thatfore not only the principle of contradiction is needed, but – in 
principle – the entire fundamental-logic. Yet is it possible in principle to doubt the possibility to 
                                                 
7 This, of course, only applies if a 'third' is excluded, i.e. the tertium non datur also applies. But this does 
not seem to be self-evident in the same way as the validity of the principle of contradiction. Think, for example, of 
the fundamental discussion in mathematics, according to which the principle of contradiction is irrevocable, but 
not the principle of the excluded third (cf. Thiel 1972: 110 f). Moreover, this principle seems obsolete in view of 
the existence of multi-value logics in which 'the third' is no longer excluded. One example is the reflection-logic 
with six truth values conceived by Ulrich Blau, which was developed primarily to deal with logical indeterminacy 
and paradoxes (cf. Blau 1985). – In general it can be said that such multi-value logics are constructs in which cer-
tain possibilities of validity are fixed by convention. It is essential that such constructs also require fundamental-
logical means on the meta-level – namely for their introduction and rules of operation. However, the logic opera-
ting at this level, at least the logic operating at the highest meta-level, at any rate is two-valued. For (I take over 
this argument from U. Blau, oral communication) there is only the alternative of 'true' and 'false', for example re-
garding the question whether a proposition within the framework of a trivalent logic has that third truth value or 
not: there cannot be a third again. But the 'highest' meta-level – in the perspective of the theory of justification re-
levant here – is the transcendental-logical one. The fact that it this absolutely unassailable means, in the sense of 
these considerations, that its logic is two-valued and that on this level the principle of the excluded third applies. 
From a transcendental-logical point of view, this principle is thus just as unassailable as the principle of contradic-
tion and (more on this in a moment) the principle of the non-equivalence of position and negation. The recourse to 
the principle of the excluded third in the previous considerations is thus also transcendentally legitimized. See al-
so footnote 13. 
8 "Determinatio negatio est" (Hösle 1987: 195). 
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argue ? As already mentioned in the introduction, there could then not be any doubt, too; becau-
se even those who doubt must argue, use meaningful terms etc. In the sense of such a transcen-
dental argument, it is generally to be assumed that the possibility of argumentation cannot be 
doubted and thus – in principle – the entire fundamental-logic is already involved and implicitly 
'effective'.9    
However, if the logic in this sense implicitly comes to be effective, then can be stringently 
argued without the whole instrument of fundamental-logic having to be explicitly available for 
this – just as it is also possible to prove by mere counting that one and one is two without ha-
ving to explicitly resort to the Peano axioms (which are of course implicitly used in counting). 
This is a significant circumstance; for it means that cognition, although it does not explicitly 
have the entire fundamental-logic at its disposal, can nevertheless progress to new cognition. 
Recognition is not limited to a factual state of knowledge – for example, in the form of innate or 
empirical knowledge – but can, so to speak, draw from an underground potential that not only 
lends validity to its argumentation, but above all enables it to progress. 
The just formulated question concerning the knowledge of fundamental-logic itself, and 
that means the acquisition of absolute, ultimate-grounded knowledge, can therefore be answe-
red in this way: That which is only to be recognized here, must and can already be implicitly ac-
tuated for this recognition. Thus, it becomes possible to expand our limited knowledge of the 
fundamental-logic. According to what has been said, this extension of knowledge is to be un-
derstood as that is further explicated of what is implicitly effective in such arguments. The re-
cognition of fundamental-logical structures is to be understood as their explication with implicit 
fundamental-logical means and thus, so to speak, as a self-explication of the fundamental-logic 
(cf. Wandschneider 2000 and 2013). Recognition has, as it were, only a 'releasing' – explicating 
– function in this respect: to catch up with and explicate, whereby it is implicitly always already 
guided and determined – a genuine Hegelian perspective.10 
 
3. The system perspective 
 
Now, what has been called 'fundamental-logic' here is certainly not a chaotic mélange, 
but, as logic, essentially system. Its structure as well as its contents, to affirm this once more, 
are not explicitly known and available to us due to the finite nature of our knowledge. Ne-
vertheless, in the sense of the developed conception of the implicit effectiveness of the funda-
mental-logic, the hope is not unfounded that also the system of the fundamental-logic is princi-
pally accessible to recognition and that the system knowledge thus gained is progressively ex-
pandable. The project in question is no less than an undertaking of the type of Hegelian 'logic'. 
In this context, the first question that arises is how access can be found at all to the pre-
sumed system of fundamental-logic, or in Hegel's well-known formulation: "What must be the 
beginning of science made with"? (Hegel 5.65). 
The characteristic of the beginning is usually defined as to be free of prerequisites. Ac-
cording to what has been said, however, this is misunderstandable: Because for all argumentati-
on the entire fundamental-logic is implicitly always already presupposed as transcendental con-
dition of the possibility of argumentation. The question of the beginning is therefore rather to be 
understood as the question of the beginning of the explication of fundamental-logic: What 
would to be supposed as the first step of the explication? 
Here the question arises: What at all is 'explicating'? Of course, it is an making explicit of 
what is implicitly the case – with which already a first issue has been explicated, namely that 
explicating is always about expressing that something is the case, or in short: that something is 
                                                 
9 Hegel characterizes the inconsistency of a principled doubt as follows: "If the concern to fall into error 
places a mistrust in science, which goes to work and really recognizes without such concerns, then it is not fore-
seeable why, conversely, a mistrust should not be placed in this mistrust and why it should not be worried that this 
fear to err is already error itself. In fact, it presupposes something, and indeed many things, to be true, and bases 
its concerns and consequences on it" (Hegel 3.69). 
10 It is to be reminded here of the reference given by K. Gloy that regarding Hegel's metaphysics the possi-
bility of the 'coincidence of system reason and explicit system is to be assumed' (see footnote 5). 
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being. The category of being must be considered elementary in this predicative sense. Without 
the category of being ('is') nothing can be explicated. This explication, that 'being' – in the sense 
of 'being the case' – is the condition of the possibility of explication at all, thus forms the begin-
ning of the explication process. 
In Hegel's 'Logic', too, the category of being is the first category. The argument given by 
Hegel is that of the indeterminacy of the meaning of 'being', i.e. 'being', according to Hegel, 
does not contain any determinateness at all and is therefore to be regarded as the beginning of 
determining. (Hegel 5.82) The argument given here basically boils down to the same thing: for 
the 'is' also does not yet contain any determinateness, but is only the possibility of determining 
in the sense of the statement that something is the case. In the statement 'the rose is red' the pro-
perty red is assigned to the rose by means of the 'is', which itself carries no definiteness and the-
refore applies to everything and anything, provided that it has the sense of 'being the case'. The 
category 'being' is thus to be understood as the beginning of the explication of fundamental-
logic. Explicating is determining. 
With the explication of the category of indetermined being now, through this very act of 
explication, something explicit, and that is to say somthing determined, is generated, namely the 
category 'being': The category of 'indetermined being' is – as this category – determined, i.e. 
'being' is the category with the meaning of indetermined being, but as such a well-determined 
category. For a determined category, however, there is always – qua determinateness – also the 
opposite-determined category, and that is 'non-being', in other words: The explicit introduction 
of the category 'being' immediately also requires the explicit introduction of the opposite cate-
gory 'non-being'.11 Although 'being' here means something indetermined, with this definition of 
meaning the category itself is something definite, which as definite at the same time is opposed 
to its definite opposite 'non-being', which it thus principiates. 
With the now gained duality of the categories 'being' and 'non-being' a new constellation 
of explicit categories has arisen, which further implies the question of the relationship between 
the two. First of all, it must be noted that each is the negation of the other: The category 'being' 
is not the category 'non-being'. So, in the twinkling of an eye, the category 'being' proves itself 
to be a case of 'non-being'. Although it means 'being', it is infected with 'non-being' precisely 
because it is not 'non-being'. Thus it has, as it were, the property of non-being upon itself, and 
in this respect it is 'non-being-like'. Admittedly, in that it is non-being-like, it again has the pro-
perty of being in this respect, so that it is again 'being-like'. This, in turn, is not non-being-like, 
so that thereby the property non-being-like is given again, and so forth. The category of being 
thus alternately shows the property of being and non-being. The property of 'being-like' turns 
into 'non-being-like', and 'non-being-like' turns into 'being-like'. In the relationship of the cate-
gory 'being' to its opposite category 'non-being' a strange ambivalence becomes visible with re-
gard to its properties: They oscillate, as it were, between 'being' and 'non-being'. 
This is the characteristic of an antinomic relationship.12 This is not the place for an in-
depth analysis of antinomic structures. As I have shown elsewhere (Wandschneider 2013; 
1993), this oscillation of the category 'being' on the property level of the category also has con-
sequences for the meaning 'being' of the category: It follows that this itself has antinomic cha-
racter, too, and that means that the category 'being' is not only opposite to the category 'non-
being', but also equivalent to it – equivalent in the sense that the meaning 'being' always implies 
the meaning 'non-being' and vice versa. So 'being' proves to be inseparably connected with 'non-
being'. 
 
                                                 
11 Here the argument differs from that of Hegel, who identifies the meaning 'indetermined being' with the 
meaning 'nothing'. In his note 3 to the dialectic of being/nothing, however, Hegel expresses himself also in the 
sense of what is said here: "It is precisely this indeterminacy (sc. of 'indetermined being'), however, that constitu-
tes the determinacy of the same (sc. of the category 'indetermined being')" (Hvh. D.W.) (Hegel 5.103 f). 
12 Special emphasis was given to the importance of antinomic structures for dialectics by Thomas Kessel-
ring (1984). Hegel himself has also pointed out the antinomic character of the "being-nothing-dialektic" (Hegel 
5.94). A detailed analysis of the antinomic structure and its consequences for dialectic I have undertaken in Wand-
schneider 2013, see also 1993. 
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This is certainly an odd result, which at first suggests the suspicion of a contradiction. 
However, it can be shown (see Wandschneider 2013: 46 f, 58 f) that the two opposing provisi-
ons, although inseparably linked, concern different aspects: 
Semantically, the inseparable belonging-together of 'being' and 'non-being' leads to a new 
category, namely 'determined-being', in the sense that the being of something determined is at 
the same time non-being, namely of something else determined. The being of a chair is at the 
same time a non-being of a table, and vice versa. Determined-being is a being that is, in another 
respect, at the same time a non-being, and that means a synthetic structure!13 Plato already has 
pointed out something like this in the dialogue Sophistes (e.g. 256 d ff): So Parmenides' central 
thought that being can never be non-being has become obsolete for Plato (on this, also Düsing 
1997); in this sense, he speaks of a 'patricide' of Parmenides (241 d). 
In short: Starting from the categories of 'being' and 'non-being', a new category of 'deter-
minate-being' has thus been explicated, which is characterized as the synthesis of both. Now, 
'determinate-being' references to something determined, that, as such, is not something other de-
termined – note: the being of a chair is not the being of a table, and vice versa. In other words, 
'determinate-being' more concretely unfolds as the pair of opposite categories 'so-determinate-
being' and 'other-determined-being' So a new pair of opposite categories has been explicated.  
With the appearance of a new pair of opposites, however, the question of the relationship 
of both categories arises again, with the consequence – what is no longer explained here (deve-
loped in detail in Wandschneider 2013; see also 2010) – an antinomic structure arises again, and 
from it, as before, the necessity of a synthetic connection of the opposites, and so forth.14 
Thus a procedure of successive explication of fundamental-logical categories is outlined. 
This has a dialectical character in the sense that it leads again and again to oposites, which 
make antinomic structures visible, that demand a new, synthetic category, which in turn 'disso-
ciates' again into new opposites, and so forth. The procedure thus basically ties in with the form 
of dialectical argumentation as presented in Hegel's Science of Logic. An essential difference, 
which is central to the procedure outlined here, compared to Hegel's, is to be seen in the syste-
matic demonstration of antinomic structures, from which, as I have explained elsewhere 
(Wandschneider 2013: Ch. 2 and 3), only an explicit justification of the synthesis formation re-
sults. 
These considerations will not be continued here. What is decisive is that a methodical 
procedure has thus been found which allows to explicate the initially implicit system of funda-
mental-logic. I think this is an important result for the question of the possibility of absolute, ul-
timately-grounded knowledge, because, as explained, only fundamental-logical relations can 
claim absolute validity; on the other hand, the system of fundamental-logic is not already expli-
citly available. The procedure of dialectic now, as has been shown, opens up the possibility of 
tackling the systematic explication of fundamental-logic, and is thus to be understood as a me-
thod for obtaining absolute, ultimate-grounded knowledge. 
 
4. The stringency of dialectical explication  
 
Of course, this also raises the question of the extent to which this conception can claim 
stringency. Indeed, it is difficult to name a philosophical concept that has been judged more 
controversially than dialectics. A reassurance regarding the stringency of dialectical argumenta-
tion is therefore inevitable. In the following I would like to say something more about this. 
                                                 
13 This transition to the synthetic category 'determined-being' again marks a difference regarding Hegel's 
argument, which, starting from the opposition of 'being' and 'nothing' (instead of, as  done here, from 'being' and 
'non-being'), introduces the category 'becoming' as synthesis. To justify my rejection of Hegel's version, see 
Wandschneider 2013, ch. 3.3. 
14 It has been said that the principle of the excluded third no longer applies strictly regarding dialectics. 
Admittedly that is to be understood in the sense of the level structure that is essential here: Thus, with the synthe-
sis of the opposite categories a new semantic level is reached that leaves behind the preceding opposition and in-
sofar indeed represents a third in relation to the mutually exclusive opposites – but not on the same level as this 
one; see also footnote 7.  
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Wolfgang Wieland (1978) and Vittorio Hösle (1987) have pointed out that dialectical pro-
gression is essentially based on a discrepancy between the meaning of a term and its conceptual 
properties. Wieland, for example, argues that "the category of being is something other than 
what it designates [...] The evidence of such a discrepancy is enough [...] to force the progress" 
(Wieland 1978: 201), namely "through the insight developed in a different way at each level 
[...] that the respective category does not yet give the adequate representation of the Absolute" 
(Wieland 1978: 203). As Hösle, following on from this, argues, the development of categories 
thus ultimately aims at a category "which that explicitly asserts what it implicitly presupposes" 
(Hösle 1987: 201). Only then would the conclusion of the dialectical movement be reached, in 
Hegel's Logic thus with the 'absolute idea'. Each step in the process thus leads to the fact that 
"that which in itself or for us [implicitly, D.W.] was always already there, [...] becomes, at least 
partially, explicit in the new category". "If one explicates everything that is implied in the con-
cept of being, one comes to the 'absolute idea'" (Hösle 1987: 203). 
According to this, the procedural progress is "motivated by the systematic ultimate goal of 
logic" (Wieland 1978,: 202). Does this mean that one must know this goal in advance in order 
to get there? Wieland denies this: That goal is "nowhere explicitly presupposed in the progress 
of logic; it does not enter into any of the conceptual operations as an element" (ibid.). Neverthe-
less, "the progress [...] is forced [...] by the insight, developed in a different way on each level, 
that the respective category does not yet give the adequate representation of the Absolute" 
(Wieland 1978: 203) – which is then again relativized by Wieland: "In these cases one has to 
consider that this is only an aid to understanding" (Wieland 1978: 205). Hösle, however, main-
tains "that according to Hegel philosophy is the science of the Absolute" and "that a definition 
of the essence of the Absolute that proves itself to be incomplete [...] is self-contradictory. In-
deed, it is of utmost importance to assume a claim of completeness for the individual categories; 
only then the contradiction becomes apparent with many of them" (Hösle 1987: 201) – 'contra-
diction' in the sense of a discrepancy between explicitly expressed and the implicit claim to ex-
press the Absolute. Must the dialectician after all constantly consider the Absolute, which he 
admittedly does not yet know at all? 
From this point of view, let us once again mind the considerations developed here. First a 
problem arose with regard to the beginning: The explication procedure can only use what is al-
ready explicitly available. Yet as explained before, the argumentation necessarily always makes 
use of other, initially still implicit elements of fundamental-logic, but in order to be justifiable, 
the procedure must adhere to what is explicitly available. Now, the beginning is characterized 
by the fact that nothing is explicated yet. How can the procedure then begin at all? The answer 
given here is based on the explication of the sense of explication itself: What is to be explicated 
must in any case 'be the case', or in short: it must, howsoever, 'be'. The category of being clai-
med here is thus to be understood as the first explicit element of fundamental-logic. With this 
first step of explication, however, the second step is already initiated: As this determined cate-
gory that categorizes 'being', it is not the category 'non-being', whereby the category of non-
being is also directly involved: The explication of 'being' inevitably entails that of 'non-being'. 
Thus a new constellation of explicit elements has arisen: Now that two explicit categories exist, 
the question of their relationship arises. As explained above, this leads to a complex structure 
which, when viewed more closely, has an antinomic character. Thus, the next step is marked 
out: The antinomic structure of the relationship of 'being' and 'non-being' means that both be-
long inseparably together and thus necessitate the introduction of a synthetic relationship, which 
connects the meaning of 'being' with that of 'non-being' – a new meaning of 'being', so to speak, 
which is linguistically conceptualized as 'determined-being', i.e. as a being that, as being of a 
particularly determined being, is at the same time non-being of another determined being. 
'Being' in the sense of 'determined-being' thus further forces the introduction of a new pair of 
opposites, 'so-being' and 'other-being ', which, as can be shown (Wandschneider 2013: Ch. 3.5), 
in turn makes antinomic structures visible, thereby again forces them to a new synthesis and so 
on. The procedure of dialectical category explication thus provides a sequence of categories in 
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the sense of a progressive explication of semantic basic categories.15   
The fact that this procedure is not arbitrary – otherwise it would have no explanatory va-
lue – results from the fact that it is strictly oriented, in a reflexive turn back to itself, to what 
was explained in the respective preceding procedural step, in order to add a further explicit 
element to what had already been explicated before. So, by the act of explication itself, at the 
same time a new situation is created: A new element has, so to speak, appeared on the stage of 
explication and has thereby brought about a new constellation of explicit elements – whereby at 
the same time implicitly a new fact is given – an antinomic structure – which as such now sets 
the next explication task and thus motivates a new explication step, and so on. In other words, 
each explication step creates a new discrepancy between what has just been explicated and what 
thus has been newly implicitly created, which in turn requires a new explication step. This in-
congruity, which guides the explication procedure, between what has just been explicated and 
the implicit fact that has been newly produced in the act of explication itself, is what I would li-
ke to call the explication discrepancy. 
In this way, the explication procedure is determined by itself and thus – in principle – all 
arbitrariness is eliminated: Each explication step is determined by the preceding one. Thus, not 
just any implicit content is explicated, but rather exactly that implicit content that was generated 
by the respective step itself, which can thus be concretely grasped and which passes on the pro-
cedure through the resulting explication discrepancy.16 
The dialectic is thus by no means subject to the – unfulfillable – condition that the Abso-
lute must always be applied as an explicit criterion of the procedure. What is decisive is the 
self-referential recourse of the procedure to the respective preceding step with the aim of captu-
ring the specific explicative discrepancy that occurs at each explicative step and resolving it by 
a new explicative act. 
One could characterize this as an act of reflexive self-assurance regarding the complete-
ness of knowledge. But why should completeness be the goal of knowledge? Obviously because 
underhand the Absolute is asserting itself after all, which so to speak forms the secret motive of 
cognition. Logic – in the sense of fundamental logic –, so it had become clear, brings itself imp-
licitly to validity; thinking nolens volens, we have always already subordinated ourselves to its 
absolute authority. All cunning of recognizing, to take possession of the Absolute, would be fu-
tile and useless, so Hegel's well-known formulation in the phenomenology, " if it were not actu-
ally already be and wanted to be with us " (Hegel 3.69). 
 
5. Unassailability and fallibility of absolute knowledge 
 
The reference made at the beginning to the current discussion of the ultimate-grounding 
can now be further substantiated in methodological terms: Essential for the dialectical procedu-
                                                 
15 The question of the conclusion of such an explication procedure must be left open at this point, as it re-
quired more far-reaching considerations. Cf. for this the critical considerations in Gloy 1981: 166 ff, 174 ff, and 
Hösle 1987: 196 ff.  
16 Robert B. Brandom has shown in detail that the function of logical terms is to make explicit what is imp-
licitly presupposed in the discourse: "The logical vocabulary has been characterized in this work as to make expli-
cit constitutive features of discursive practice [...], features that were implicit in what was done before the intro-
duction of that vocabulary. This is performed by terms "that qualify as logical by virtue of their role in making 
explicit". According to Brandom, what is made explicit hereby are "implicit inferential determinations" of terms 
(Brandom 2000: 737): Whoever understands the term 'dog' has also understood that from 'dog' the inference to 
'mammal' is possible. "A theory of expression thus explains how that what is explicit emerges from that what is 
implicit" (Brandom 2000: 136). Brandom himself recognizes here a Hegelian perspective (e.g. Brandom 2000: 156 
f; see also Brandom 2001). – Nevertheless: the difference to the considerations developed here cannot be overloo-
ked either: Brandom is not concerned with the project of a systematic development of that what is implicit to be 
explicated, the procedural generation of which is the actual point in the present context. According to this (see 
above) exactly that implicit content is explained which was generated by the respective preceding procedural step 
itself, thereby can be concretely grasped and passes on the procedure through the newly resulting explanation dis-
crepancy. Brandom's interest, on the other hand, is focussed on the inferential potential implicitly contained in 
empirical terms, which he understands as being socially constituted. The systematic development of fundamental-
logic is not his issue. (For more detail see Wandschneider 2006.) 
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re is, as has been shown, the recourse on the respective implicit fact generated by the preceding 
explication step and thus to be understood as a transcendental condition of the following step of 
the procedure. This turning back of thinking to itself can, with a term introduced by Wolfgang 
Kuhlmann in a transcendental-pragmatic context, also be characterized as an act of strict reflec-
tion (Kuhlmann 1985: cf. e.g. 76 ff, 119). Kuhlmann understands by it the recollection of the 
respective directly performed linguistic action (insofar 'strict') and the 'action knowledge' impli-
citly determining this linguistic action ('hereby I claim [...]', 'I presuppose [...]' etc.). A similar 
reflection on the foregoing procedural step is also given in my argument, however not on pre-
suppositions of speech acts, but on the respective procedural-generated semantic-logical con-
stellation, i.e. the logical determinations made by the procedure itself in the immediately prece-
ding explication step. With each step of the procedure a logical potential is generated, as it we-
re, which, by being reflected upon, provides new material content for the argument and thereby 
drives the procedure further – a methodically regulated strict reflection, as it were. 
For Kuhlmann, however, the question of certainty is of primary importance: "When I 
make a claim, there can be no doubt that I have made an act of assertion, because that cor-
responds to my intention in making the claim. When I speak meaningfully, I must know what I 
mean when I speak: in this respect, the 'knowledge of action' associated with speech acts is in-
deed of immediate certainty for the speaker himself. 
This is of course a private certainty. Although, according to the 'private-language-
argument', there can be no private language in the strict sense, but what is intentional intended 
is immedately certain only for me – the intentional speaker. The addressee of my speech can on-
ly indirectly realize its meaning and thus only have hypothetical certainty. Therefore, the aspect 
of private evidence is not relevant for the foundation of philosophy. What is decisive is the va-
lidity of the argument, and that is solely a question of logic. 
With this proviso the principle of strict reflection in the sense of the developed considera-
tions is justified: Each explication step is then only possible in recourse to the previous one, to 
the new constellation thus generated of explicit elements and their implicit logical structure. 
The dialectical procedure so indeed has the character of strict reflection, which here, however, 
is not to be understood as a recourse to a privately performed (and moreover contingent) lingui-
stic act, but, as explained, as an objective procedural principle, which would thus be characteri-
zed as methodically regulated strict reflection. Thus the logic effective in all argumentation ta-
kes the place of the only privately accessible linguistic action knowledge. But, admittedly, in 
this way no direct knowledge and no direct evidence is possible, so that the possibility of error 
cannot be excluded in principle. This marks the obvious difference between the developed view 
and the transcendental-pragmatic position advocated by Kuhlmann – notwithstanding the un-
doubtedly common interest of both with regard to the possibility of ultimate-grounding 
From there also light is shed on the question of the fallibility of knowledge: Not that the 
intentions accompanying my speech actions are directly accessible and evident to me, can be 
regarded as criterion of knowledge, but only the logical justification of knowledge, accessible 
and objectively comprehensible to all – which as such is admittedly also prone to error. Hegel 
remarks that Plato reworked the 'Politeia' seven times; for an undertaking of the type of Hegeli-
an logic it would have been desirable, according to Hegel, that "the free leisure to work through 
it seventy-seven times would have been granted" (Hegel 5.33). Ultimate-grounded, absolute 
knowledge' is indeed not synonymous with 'ultimate, absolute certainty': it cannot be 'ultimate' 
knowledge, since, as explained, it is knowledge that can be overtaken, i.e. further developed, 
forther specified. And the aspect of absolute subjective certainty is objectively irrelevant accor-
ding to what has been said. If it is 'ultimately-groundable', this rather means that it can be 
shown to be 'absolute' for logical reasons, i.e. to negate it would be self-contradictory. But re-
garding the 'justification of logical reasons', errors of thought, i.e. subjective errors, cannot be 
excluded in principle. However, 'errors cannot be excluded in principle' is certainly not the sa-
me as 'errors are inevitable in principle', or, to put it more briefly: 'Error is possible' is not the 
same as 'error is necessary'. The latter is the pragmatically contradictory and thus untenable the-
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sis of fallibilism,17 which must therefore be rejected. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Altogether: Three main points have become visible for the outlined procedure of dialecti-
cal explication of fundamental-logic: 
 (1) On the one hand, it has a strictly methodological character. Its results are not beheld, 
guessed or even subreptitiously obtained, but are generated in a methodically comprehensible 
way. In this sense they are principally justifiable and can therefore appear with a strictly scienti-
fic claim. Indeed they are also overtakable in the sense of 'further developable', i.e. 'specifiable'. 
But the overtakeability of the categories derived does not prevent the stringency of their dialec-
tical reconstruction, and that also means: Overtakeable categories are not 'false' categories. The 
'correct' meaning of a category is rather that which belongs to the respective state of the proce-
dure. The category belonging to a more advanced stage of the procedure is not the more correct 
one, but only a more specific category.18 And the argument on which it is based is by no means 
more stringent than that in the case of a procedurally earlier category. 
 (2) The direction of dialectical progression is determined by the procedure itself, in so far 
as the next step is logically determined by the previous one. In this sense, dialectics, as Hegel 
repeatedly emphasizes, is not a method that would be applied externally, i.e. arbitrarily, to an 
already ready given object. Rather, it produces its object itself, and in this sense, with Hegel, it 
can indeed be characterized as a self-movement of the concept.19 
 (3) Finally, the procedure also has a heuristic function: as a guideline for the systematic 
exploration and explication of the system of fundamental-logic. It is intuitively obvious that the 
procedure of dialectical category explication is always a progression towards higher conceptual 
complexity; for each element that is newly explicated expands the overall constellation of exp-
licit elements. That the case of a mere iteration can be excluded can be derived from the speci-
fic structure of dialectical development, which, via antithetical terms, leads to synthetic catego-
ries, with which, as it were, a new conceptual level is reached, on which new antithetical terms 
appear, etc. At the same time, it is clear that this development would only be complete when it 
no longer generates new opposites and thus no longer poses a new explication task. 
Justifiability, self-movement and the heuristic character of dialectical category explication 
are thus closely connected and qualify it as the sought-after procedure of the self-explication of 
logic by logical means. Hegel's Science of Logic is – after proleptic approaches, for example 
with Plato (cf. e.g. Sophistes 251a ff, Parmenides 135c ff) and Leibniz – certainly the most ela-
borated draft of such a system to date: a gigantic, admirable construct of thought, which ne-
vertheless also shows cracks and breaks20 and thus could rather be understood as a still unfinis-
hed metaphysical project, not yet as the elaborate system of fundamental-logic. The fact that 
this metaphysical claim has in fact not yet been fulfilled, neither in Plato's nor Hegel's work nor 
in current thinking, speaks neither against the sense nor against the feasibility of the project. 
With the initially punctual proof of ultimately-grounded truth, both meaning and feasibility can 
                                                 
17 Following the footsteps of Karl R. Popper, again discussed and vehemently represented by Hans Albert 
(31975), among others. 
18 For this reason, as explained in the introduction, it is possible to argue stringently with a still largely un-
defined concept of truth (even with regard to the possibility of absolute truth), without having to have definitively 
solved the problem of truth negotiated in most diverse theories of truth beforehand. As has been shown, it is suffi-
cient to know that a statement is always associated with a claim to truth.  
19 From Hegel's Science of Logic here a formulation that also expresses the turning back of the argumenta-
tion to itself: "Movement as progressing turns directly to itself and is only in this way self-motion – movement 
that comes from itself" (Hegel 6.28). 
20 Cf. e.g. the extension of the Hegelian logic by the category of intersubjectivity, asserted by Vittorio Hös-
le, which is to be necessary for a sufficient foundation of philosophy of mind. Hösle argues that "the real-
philosophy is not completely 'covered' by logic, because objective mind and absolute mind contain categories of 
intersubjectivity and thus open a real-philosophical sphere that is no longer principiated by the logic as it is. [...] 
So in the divergence of logic and real-philosophy there seems to be a real inconsistency – an inconsistency that 
probably points to an incompleteness of the logic" (Hösle 1987: 646).  
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rather be regarded as secured in advance. What is lacking is the comprehensive, systematic ela-
boration of what has been outlined here. 
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